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Multiple subtypes of avian influenza (AI) and novel reassortants are frequen-
tly isolated from live bird markets (LBMs). However, our understanding of
the drivers of persistence of multiple AI subtypes is limited. We propose a
stochastic model of AI transmission within an LBM that incorporates market
size, turnover rate and the balance of direct versus environmental transmissi-
bility. We investigate the relationship between these factors and the critical
community size (CCS) for the persistence of single and multiple AI strains
within an LBM. We fit different models of seeding from farms to two-strain
surveillance data collected from Shantou, China. For a single strain and plaus-
ible estimates for continuous turnover rates and transmissibility, the CCS was
approximately 11 800 birds, only a 4.2% increase in this estimatewas needed to
ensure persistence of the co-infecting strains (two strains in a single host). Pre-
cise values of CCS estimates were sensitive to changes in market turnover rate
and duration of the latent period. Assuming a gradual daily sell rate of birds
the estimated CCS was higher than when an instantaneous selling rate was
assumed. We were able to reproduce prevalence dynamics similar to obser-
vations from a single market in China with infection seeded every 5–15
days, and a maximum non-seeding duration of 80 days. Our findings suggest
that persistence of co-infections is more likely to be owing to sequential infec-
tion of single strains rather than ongoing transmission of both strains
concurrently. In anygiven system fora fixed set of ecological and epidemiological
conditions, there is an LBM size belowwhich the risk of sustained co-circulation
is low andwhichmay suggest a clear policy opportunity to reduce the frequency
of influenza co-infection in poultry.
1. Introduction
The transmission of avian influenza (AI) within live birdmarkets (LBMs) in South
East Asia continues to threaten human and animal health [1,2]. LBMs are a known
source of AI in which high densities of poultry, unhygienic conditions, infected
drinkingwater anddust particles all serve to amplify transmission [3–6]. The con-
tinuous introduction of naive birds into LBMs replacing those sold ensures that
the pool of hosts susceptible to infection is continuously replenished, facilitating
ongoing transmission of AI within LBMs. In addition, the movement of humans
and poultry between farms and markets across different geographical areas
further contributes to the spread of multiple AI strains [3,5].
The critical community size (CCS) for a pathogen is defined as the threshold
population size required for the persistence of transmission, such that the
& 2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
probability of stochastic fade-out is very low [7], and can be
derived analytically for certain diseases for a given value of
R0. While the concept has been used for infectious diseases of
humans formany years [8] and alsowithinwildlife populations
[9] it has not been applied to the persistence of AI in a multi-
strain system. The persistence of AI within LBMs is of public
health and evolutionary importance; if multiple different
AI strains persist in LBMs, there is greater opportunity for co-
infection, where a co-infection is the presence of at least two
independent viruseswithin a single host. Frequent co-infections
with genetically distinct viruses increase the opportunity for
novel viruses to be generated through reassortment.
The importance of understanding the dynamics of AI and
risk factors for transmission in LBMs first became apparent fol-
lowing the emergence of a new reassortant virus, highly
pathogenic AI (HPAI)H5N1 in poultry in 1996 [1], and the sub-
sequent detection of human cases in 1997 [10]. More recently,
the emergence of novel reassortant viruses including: H10N8
[11], H5N8 [12], H7N9 [13], and the subsequent spillover into
the human population, justify the ongoing concern LBMs
present to humans and poultry.
Reassortant viral lineages continue to be identified in rou-
tine surveillance data collected from LBMs [14,15]. Because
co-infection of a host with two different strains is a necessary
prerequisite for reassortment to occur, the higher the number
of co-infection events that occur, the greater the chance that
transmissible and pathogenic novel reassortant progeny will
be generated.Here,we use theword strain to describe a distinct
lineage that may reassort with another lineage. Currently, we
have a poor understanding of the frequency of co-infection in
LBMs and the factors driving persistence [16]. A better under-
standing of factors that predict the persistence of multiple
strains would provide a foundation for advancing our ability
to predict the risk of reassortment. Worryingly, an increasing
number of studies are showing that reassortment between
different AI subtypes and human endemic subtypes can
readily occur [17,18] and spillover of AI infections into the
human population continue to be reported as a consequence
of exposure to LBMs.
Mathematical models that seek to capture the dynamic
nature and rapid turnover of LBMs remain rare, with detailed
work on the mechanisms that generate the observed dynamics
of infection restricted to single strains [3,16]. One such analysis
by Pepin et al. [16] suggested that components of the poultry
distribution system (farms and wholesale LBMs (wLBMs))
feeding into retail LBMs (rLBMs) were likely to be important
points in the supply chain that were contributing to the seeding
and on-going spread of AI within LBMs, but that rLBMs alone
were unlikely to be the source of all infection [16]. Therefore,
further investigation is required at points in the supply chain
prior to birds entering LBMs.
If effective public health control measures are to be devel-
oped it is important to understand the ecological and
epidemiological drivers of persistence such thatwe understand
the conditions in which AI persistence is most likely to occur.
Here we use a multi-strain stochastic susceptible, exposed,
infected, recovered (SEIR) model to investigate the drivers of
single and co-infecting strains, where co-infecting strains are
two genetically distinct, independent viruses within a single
host. Subsequent reassortment that may occur following co-
infection is not considered.We assess howdifferent parameters
impact the persistence probability of a single AI strain, we
determine the CCS for single and co-infecting strains, and the
relationship between the CCS, market turnover rate and the
R0 of co-circulating strains. We highlight high-risk features of
LBM systems that may increase opportunities for AI persist-
ence. We then use time series data collected in Shantou,
China, in 2006 to explore the mechanisms that may generate
the non-persistentmulti-straindynamics observed in surveillance
data from a wLBM.
2. Material and methods
(a) Dynamic co-infection model
We modelled the dynamics of infection within a single LBM in
rural China, where birds were moved into the LBM on a daily
basis from different sized farms and geographical locations, and
then moved out of the market on a daily basis through selling to
other smaller markets, farmers or directly to individuals for
consumption. Interactions and importations between external
farms and the market were modelled such that at one time point
within a day, birds would be brought into the market and at the
same time point approximately the same proportion were sold
onwards (i.e. instantaneous turnover). As turnover rates within
markets remain poorly quantified, we also examined the effects
of different fixed turnover rates (above and below 50%) on our
model outcomes. We assumed the market population size
remained approximately constant, which is the prevailing opinion
of fieldworkers as physical space is a scarce resource within LBMs
and is therefore highly utilized [19,20]. However, although the
market population may be approximately constant across days
(except at major holidays), it is unlikely to be constant throughout
the course of a day—i.e. most birds come in in the morning (high-
est population size) and gradually leave throughout the day
(population size decreases gradually throughout the day). Thus,
we also evaluated how fluctuations in population throughout
the day impacted CCS estimates. Insights from the variable popu-
lation sizes throughout the day could be extrapolated to interpret
the effects of variable population sizes during holiday seasons.
We developed a within-market probabilistic multi-strain SEIR
Markovian model that allowed for co-infection with two strains
[21,22]. The stochastic infection dynamics were governed by tran-
sitions between states depicted in the electronic supplementary
material, figure S1. Infection was either transmitted by direct
within-flock transmission or environmental transmission through
direct contact with infected drinking water, faeces or fomites
[3,21,23]. Parameter values are provided in the electronic
supplementary material, table S1.
Birds in the S compartment were susceptible to infection with
all strains (A, B and AB, which denote strain A, B and the co-infec-
tionwith independent strains A andB (AB), respectively). Exposed
(E) birds were infected but not infectious to other birds, and sus-
ceptible to infection with a second strain. I birds were infectious
to other birds, and temporarily immune to infection with a
second strain [24,25] as a consequence of the innate immune
response to infection [26]. In terms of adaptive immunity, R
birds were fully recovered, and immune to re-infection with the
same strain (i.e. full homologous immunity) but were susceptible
to infection with a second strain with the same probability as
fully susceptible hosts (S) (no cross-immunity). States in which
birds were S, E, I or R to both strains were denoted as subscripted
state symbols.We do not explicitlymodel particular AI strains, but
generallymodel possiblemulti-strain dynamics. Additionalmodel
description is provided in the electronic supplementary infor-
mation. Co-infection here represents simultaneous infection with
strain A and B, thus our notation for co-infection reflects the
host’s state. Supporting quantitative evidence for the relative infec-
tivity of two strains in co-infected birds was limited, therefore, we
assumed co-infected birds always transmitted strains A and B
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concurrently (i.e. equal fitness for both strains) and that this led to
direct co-infection in a susceptible bird. As a minimum criteria for
co-infection, each individual strain must be capable of establishing
sustained transmission for a period of time in a rapid-turnover
market. Therefore, we define Rtotal0 for a single strain as the sum
of Rwf0 and R
env
0 .
The contribution from the environment Renv0 was
Renv0 ¼
4s
(4sþ e)
 4vN
hc
1
e
1 4g
(4gþ e)
 4
benv, ð2:1Þ
where s is the duration of the latent period, e is the rate at which
birds are sold, g is the duration of the infectious period, v is the
rate at which infectious birds shed virions, N is the number of
birds in themarket,h is the rate of virion decay in the environment,
c is a restricted half-saturation constant for environmental trans-
mission, and benv is the transmission rate from the environment
to birds.
The within flock Rwf0 was calculated as:
Rwf0 ¼
4s
(4sþ e)
 41
e
1 4g
(4gþ e)
 4
bwf, ð2:2Þ
where bwf is the transmission rate between birds.
Therefore, Rtotal0 ¼ Rwf0 þ Renv0 .
We note that an analytical derivation of an invasion criteria
for the co-infecting strains in the system is not feasible here [21].
(b) Assessing variation in the probability of persistence
for a single strain
We assessed how variation in bwf, benv, v and h (electronic
supplementary material, table S1) impacted the probability of
persistence for a single strain. We used Latin hypercube sampling
of the four parameters (1000 samples) and calculated the partial
rank correlation coefficient using ‘epiR’ [27] to determine if any
parameters had substantially more impact on the probability
of persistence.
(c) Definition of a critical community size for the
persistence of co-infecting strains
We define the CCS as the population size of themarket required to
ensure the persistence (at least one infected bird in the market) of a
single strain 1 year after infection is seeded with a probability of at
least 0.99 [7,8,28]. The dynamics of infection and circulating strains
can vary markedly between different years, therefore we con-
sidered persistence only within a single year. The definition for
the persistence of co-infecting strains is more complicated. Even
if direct transmission of the co-infecting strain fades out, if both
individual strains are still circulating, direct transmission of the
co-infecting strains can re-emerge. Thus, we calculate the CCS
for the persistence of the co-infecting strains by considering the fre-
quency with which a single introduction of both strains separately
results in an epidemic of the co-infecting strains which persists for
at least 1 year, ensuring the number of birds infected with strain A
and B (individually), or strain AB is greater than 1 at the end of the
year. The CCS was estimated through simulation.
As variation in the population size directly impacted R0, we
explored how the CCS varied when other components of R0
were altered. For the single-strain CCS, we increased the within-
flock and environmental transmissibility, infectious period, viral
decay and shedding rates to 25% and 75% above the baseline
values. For the co-infecting strains CCSwe decreased all aforemen-
tioned parameters by 25% for the co-infecting strains and then
increased all aforementioned parameters for one of the founding
strains by 75%. Sensitivity of CCS estimates for the co-infecting
strains to changes in the duration of the latent period and market
turnover rates were also assessed.
(d) Surveillance data
Samples from named wLBMs in Shantou, China were taken
between 2005 and 2006 and were collected reliably with a fre-
quency of two to four weeks. Embryonated chicken eggs were
used to isolate virus. Subtypes H1–H13 were tested for with
monospecific antisera in haemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests.
Further detail on the methods of data collection can be found in
Pepin et al. [5].
We focused on samples isolated from ducks from one
wholesale market, as these were the hosts from which isolation of
co-infected samples was highest [5], we looked at low pathogenic
H3 and H6 infections (two strains from different subtypes), no
data on neuraminidase type was available. Detail on the
demography and ecology of the market was not collected, but in
Shantou it is known that wholesale market birds come from both
small backyard flock farms, as well as medium-sized poultry
holdings where birds are kept indoors and isolated from other
species [5]. Data from 2006 reported a higher prevalence of
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Figure 1. The prevalence of H3, H6 and H3/H6 co-infection in ducks in the surveillance data between 2005 and 2006. The red line shows the prevalence of H3, the
blue shows the prevalence of H6 and the cyan line shows the prevalence of H3/H6 co-infecteds. Overall, the prevalence of both strains was much higher in 2006
compared with 2005, although despite this the overall prevalence of co-infection with both strains was low.
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co-infection and larger single strain epidemic peaks when com-
pared with 2005, therefore, we used data from 2006 (figure 1).
(e) Seeding infection to generate the two-strain
dynamics: comparison to surveillance data
We specified a random process for the introduction of each strain,
where frequency, duration and prevalence of infection imported
were drawn from random uniform waiting time distributions.
Birds (5000) were brought into the market on a daily basis. Birds
were imported on seeding days in the I state infected with strain A
or B, all remaining birdswere imported in the S state. An illustration
of the seeding process is presented in the electronic supplementary
material, figure S2. Maximum and minimum ranges of infection
prevalence, and duration of seeding and non-seeding days were
informedby thedata. Eachof the 10models corresponding to differ-
ent seeding regiments (electronic supplementary material, table S2)
were run for 365days, for 10 000 independent stochastic realizations.
Co-infection data were not used to match the seeding scenarios
owing to the very low reported prevalence.
Four summary statistics were calculated for each model realiz-
ation and compared to those calculated from the data [29]. These
were: (i) correlation between the two circulating strains; (ii) the
number of epidemic peaks for each strain; (iii) the periodicity of
the observed epidemics (by Fourier transform of the time series);
and (iv) the mean prevalence of each circulating strain.
Nonparametric approximations were used to locally estimate the
probability density using the 10 000 realizations of each model
for each summary statistic [29]. The model with the largest inter-
section of realizations across all four summary statistics that fell
within+50% of the data valuewas selected as the best performing
model. All calculations and simulations were performed with R
v. 3.2.1 [30].
3. Results
(a) Persistence and critical community size for a single
strain
We explored the impact of four key model parameters on the
probability of AI persistence (figure 2). Increases in the values
ofbwf,benv and viral shedding rate (v) increased the probability
of persistence for a single strain, while increases in the rate
of viral decay (h) decreased the probability of persistence. All
parameter values are presented in the electronic supplementary
material, table S1. Variation in the probability of persistence
across the range of values evaluated reduced as the average
daily population size of the market (N) increased. When bwf
was 0.2 and N¼ 2000 birds the probability of persistence was
0.05; when N ¼ 15 000 the probability of persistence was 0.7.
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Figure 2. Probability of infection persistence for four key model parameters: bwf, viral decay rate (h), viral shedding rate (v) and benv across a range of values
identified in the literature, considering a range of average population sizes from 2000 to 15 000 birds. We calculated the standard deviation of the mean for the
probability of persistence for each range of parameter values provided, we used+ standard deviation of the mean to calculate the uncertainty about the mean for
all parameters, indicated by the polygon. Baseline parameter values are indicated with an asterisk.
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Thus, the probability of persistence increased by 1300% with a
650% increase inN. Equally, if benv was 0.25 and N ¼ 5000, the
probability of persistence was approximately 0.60, but approxi-
mately 0.88 whenN ¼ 10 000 (a 46% increase in the probability
of persistence with a 100% increase inN). Across all parameter
ranges, the largest proportional increase in the probability of
persistence was seen when N increased from 5000 to 10 000
birds (electronic supplementary material, figure S4).
At smaller population sizes, all parameters had a sub-
stantial impact on an invading strain’s probability to persist
(figure 2), generally, a steeper gradient and magnitude
of change across the range of parameter values in smaller
market sizes. When N was 5000 and hwas 0.1, the probability
of persistence was approximately 0.98, when h was increased
to 1.2, the probability of persistence decreased to approxi-
mately 0.25 (74%). However, when N was 15 000 and h was
0.1 and the probability of persistence was 1. When the h was
1.2 the probability of persistence was 0.7 (a 30% decrease)
(figure 2). Differences in the probability of persistence across
the parameters were least substantial when looking at h,
suggesting assumed values of viral decay rate may be a less
important driver of persistence relative to the other parameters
examined. By contrast, for any given N, the greatest variation
in the probability of persistence was seen for v (figure 2;
electronic supplementary material, figure S4).
Market turnover rate and hence average dailymarket popu-
lation size played a key role in determining the probability of
persistence. For our baseline parameters (electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S1) and an instantaneous market turnover
rate of 50%, a sigmoidal relationship between the probability
of persistence and CCS was observed (electronic supple-
mentary material, figure S5a). Following increases in the
population size above 11 800, no further marked increases in
the probability of persistence were seen, suggesting the CCS
for a single strain in this scenario was approximately 11 800
birds (figure 3a), with a corresponding R0 of 1.01 (electronic
supplementary material, table S3). Assuming the baseline par-
ameter values but where 50% of birds were sold gradually on a
daily basis the estimated CCSwas approximately 19 800 (figure
3c; electronic supplementary material, figure S5c), a 68%
increase in the CCS compared with instantaneous turnover.
As the market turnover rate increased, and hence the average
duration of stay for a bird within the market decreased, the esti-
mated CCS also increased (figure 3a). For our baseline
parameters and an instantaneous market turnover rate of 10%
(electronic supplementary material, table S1), the CCS was
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Figure 3. The CCS estimated through simulation analysis for 1000 realizations, for a range of market turnover rates. (a) Estimated CCS for a single strain across a
range of instantaneous market turnover rates for the baseline parameters (red), when transmissibility of the strain was increased by 25% (blue), and by 75%
(green). (b) Estimated CCS for the co-infecting strains across a range of instantaneous market turnover rates for the baseline parameters (red), when transmissibility
of a single founding strain was increased by 75% (green), when the transmissibility of the co-infecting strain was reduced by 25% (purple). (c) Estimated CCS for a
single strain across a range of gradual market turnover rates for the baseline parameters (red), when transmissibility of the strain was increased by 25% (blue), and
by 75% (green). (d ) Estimated CCS for the co-infecting strains across a range of gradual market turnover rates for the baseline parameters (red), when transmis-
sibility of a single founding strain was increased by 75% (green), when the transmissibility of the co-infecting strains was reduced by 25% (purple).
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200 birds (R0  1.67), when 10% of the market population was
sold gradually the CCS was approximately 250, a 25% increase
in the estimated CCS. If an instantaneous market turnover
rate of 90%was assumed the estimatedCCSwas approximately
120 000 birds, but if 90%were sold gradually the estimatedCCS
was approximately 400 000 birds (figure 3b), a 233% increase in
the estimated CCS.
As the transmissibility, viral decay and shedding rates,
and duration of infection for a single strain increased by 75%
from the baseline values (electronic supplementary material,
table S1), the CCS at any given rate of market turnover
was reduced (figure 3a,c). However, if transmissibility of the
strain was increased by 75%, the estimated CCS was approxi-
mately 3500 birds (R0  1.32, electronic supplementary
material, table S3) (figure 3a). As with the baseline parameters,
estimates of the CCS with gradual turnover were consistently
higher thanwith instantaneous turnover, however, the propor-
tional differences in the CCS between turnover frequencies
were consistent when parameter values were increased by
75% (figure 3).
(b) Critical community size for the persistence of
co-infecting strains
Assuming the baseline parameters (electronic supplementary
material, table S1) and an instantaneous market turnover
rate of 50%, the estimated CCS was approximately 12 200
(figure 3c; electronic supplementary material, figure S5b). As
the average daily market population size decreased the prob-
ability of persistence of the co-infecting strains decreased. If
50% of birds were sold gradually throughout the day the esti-
mated CCS was approximately 22 000 (figure 3d; electronic
supplementary material, figure S5d), an 80% increase in the CCS.
With a 25% decrease in the baseline parameters of the co-
infecting strains, the estimated CCS was similar to the baseline
estimates assuming instantaneous turnover (figure 3c). When
the instantaneous turnover rate was 60% or higher, the CCS
for all three levels of transmissibility was similar, and tended
to be approximately 500 birds greater than for a single strain
(figure 3c,d ). Generally, across all market turnover rates only
a small increase in the CCS for the co-infecting strains was
seen relative to the single strain whether turnover was instan-
taneous or gradual (figure 3c,d). This suggests that direct
transmission of co-infecting strains is less important for the per-
sistence of co-infection, and that the main factor facilitating the
persistence of the co-infecting strains is the persistence of both
individual strains, where sequential infection with both strains
leads to a co-infection.
As the duration of the latent period increased for a fixed
market turnover rate, the CCS of the co-infecting strains
increased (electronic supplementary material, figure S6).
Assuming a latent period of 6 days and a market turnover of
10%, the estimated CCS was approximately 1250 birds (elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S6). However, if
market turnover was increased to greater than 40%, the esti-
mated CCS was greater than 100 000 birds. If the latent
period was 3 days or less and market turnover was less than
75%, all CCS estimates were less than 100 000 birds (electronic
supplementary material, figure S6).
As the transmissibility, decay and shedding rates and the
duration of infection were increased by 75% for both founding
strains, the average population size required to ensure persist-
ence decreased (electronic supplementary material, figure S7).
Considering a market turnover rate of 10%, the probability of
persistence for 500 or more birds was 1, but if the baseline par-
ameters were reduced by 25%, approximately 5000 birds were
needed to ensure a persistence probability of greater than 0.99.
If market turnover was 40% and baseline epidemiological par-
ameters were increased by 75%, an average daily population of
approximately 1000 birds ensured persistence. However, if
market turnover was 70%, greater than 10 000 birds were
needed to ensure a persistence probability of 1 (electronic
supplementary material, figure S7).
(c) Comparison with data
No evidence of persistent transmission of either of the two
AI strains was observed in the surveillance data (figure 1),
suggesting the population size of the market that generated
the data was less than the CCS for a single strain identified
in §3a. Therefore, an average population of 10 000 birds
was assumed to evaluate 10 different seeding models
outlined in the electronic supplementary material, table S2.
We initially found that autochthonous transmission was
not sufficient to generate the observed infection incidence,
and could not ensure that the regular outbreaks observed
in the data were generated in the simulation (electronic
supplementary material, figure S8).
Model 2 seeding a prevalence of 0–50% every 5–30 days,
with a maximum non-seeding duration of 80 days was most
consistent with the data. We judged consistency by the
number of model realizations that were able to simultaneously
match all the summary statistics (table 1). Models 1 and 2
scored the same for overall matching (6 out of 1000). We
chose model 2 because model 1 had a very low number of
matches to the number of strain 1 peaks. We present a
random subset of four realizations obtained from model 2
(electronic supplementary material, figure S9). Models 1 and
5 were the next best performing. Both models drew prevalence
values between 0 and 70% every 1–30 days, with a maximum
non-seeding duration of 80 and 100 days, for models 1 and 5,
respectively. Therefore, introduction of a relatively high preva-
lence of infection and a number of consecutive infection
seeding days (greater than 5) are likely to be important features
of the system.
Models for which the range of seeding days was a maxi-
mum of 12 days (models 6–10), were unable to capture the
calculated correlation between the two circulating strains.
Models 9 and 10 had the shortest range of seeding and
non-seeding days, where infection was seeded between every
1–12 days and not seeded every 2–40 days. This suggests
frequent seeding and non-seeding intervals at high levels
of prevalence may be able to capture the high prevalence of
infection in the data (table 1), but not the dynamic interplay
between two circulating strains. For models 6–10 the inability
to capture some summary statistics resulted in none of these
models being able to satisfy all criteria across the four statistics
simultaneously (table 1). If the stringency of the criteria were
reduced to assess the intersection of realizations between two
or three summary statistics, very limited overlap between stat-
istics for the same model were seen (electronic supplementary
material, table S6).
4. Discussion
We have used a stochastic transmission model to investigate
which mechanistic properties and parameter sets could
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capture prevalence data of two co-circulating strains seen in
surveillance data collected from a wLBM in Shantou, China.
Our findings highlight that re-introduction of infection into
wLBMs is required to generate the infection dynamics seen
in surveillance data. The need to continuously re-seed infec-
tion suggests that more needs to be done at the farming and
production level to ensure that birds come to the market
infection free.
Viral shedding rate and benv were the most significant
determinants of viral persistence, highlighting that further
research should be conducted to more accurately quantify
these parameters. The higher the market turnover rate the
higher the average population size required for transmission
to become self-sustaining, implying that both the size of the
market and its expected turnover rate need to be considered
when assessing the opportunities for AI persistence. This find-
ing supports previous calls to reduce the time birds spend in
the market [16,20]. Studies have shown that higher volumes
of minor poultry sales resulted in a significant increase in
virus isolation rates [20], and that live poultry market density
was the most important predictor of H7N9 infection risk
within poultry markets [31]. These findings in combination
with the work presented in this article emphasize the impor-
tance of also considering market population size to limit the
opportunity for AI persistence.
Depending on the geographical location of the market the
estimates of the CSS identified across a range of parameter com-
binations may not be considered particularly large [32]. With
increasing market turnover rate, the estimated CCS increased.
Yet as the transmissibility of circulating strains increased, the
CCS for a single strain reduced substantially. Our results
show that persistence of co-infection under typical market
conditions requires continued seeding of both strains, and
that continual introduction of both strains separately (as
opposed to introduction as co-infections) can lead to long-
term persistence of co-infection. This observation may mean
that the co-circulation and persistence of multiple strains
increases the frequency of co-infected birds, without the need
to ensure frequent transmission of the co-infecting strains
concurrently.
There are a number of limitations to this study. The model
is stochastic and the results have only been compared to data
from a single year and geographical region. Therefore, there
is a chance that some parameter sets performed better than
others as a consequence of stochastic variation. However, the
broader finding that regular external seeding of infection
into LBMs is required to generate the epidemics of multiple
strains observed in surveillance data is likely to hold true for
other settings. We may have underestimated the CCS for the
co-infecting strains as we assumed that co-infected birds only
transmitted both strains concurrently. However, the prob-
ability of transmission of each strain from a co-infected host
may differ, which may reduce the frequency with which
co-infection events occur increasing the CCS.
In reality more strains and host species are present within a
market than modelled here, and susceptibility to infection is
likely to vary between hosts and strains. We assumed there
wasno long-term cross-protective immunity following recovery
from infection with a single strain [22], and that short-term
cross-immunity was 100%. However, given the short average
stay times of birds within the market system modelled,
our assumption should not impact our findings on AI persist-
ence. Within the system modelled there is competition for
susceptible hosts, therefore if there were marked differences in
Table 1. The model values are the density of observations that fell within the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the data for each of the 10 models evaluated, for
each summary statistic. (Higher values (up to 1) indicate that the model performed well for that summary statistic. Values provided in the data row represent
the values for each summary statistic calculated from the data.)
model correlationa
mean prevalence 2
strain 1b
mean prevalence 2
strain 2c Fourierd
N peaks 2
strain 1e
N peaks 2
strain 2f
total
matchesg
data 20.223 0.067 0.235 2.4 13 4
model 1 0.52 0.33 0.95 0.40 0.08 0.37 0.006
model 2 0.41 0.11 0.66 0.15 0.71 0.24 0.006
model 3 0.54 0.41 0.62 0.15 0.25 0.20 0
model 4 0.001 0 0.99 0.88 0.20 0 0
model 5 0.18 0.15 0.49 0.18 0.31 0.05 0.005
model 6 0.003 0.40 0.001 0.01 0 0.24 0
model 7 0.03 0.14 0 0.02 0 0.10 0
model 8 0.02 0.13 0 0.01 0 0.11 0
model 9 0.003 0 0.99 0.47 0.72 0 0
model 10 0.07 0 0.99 0.83 0.64 0 0
aThe correlation between the two strains circulating for the data and for all models the density of observations that fell within the 95% conﬁdence intervals
(CIs) of the data.
bThe mean prevalence of the ﬁrst strain and the density of stochastic observations that fell within the 95% CIs of the data.
cThe mean prevalence of the second strain and the density of stochastic observations that fell within the 95% CIs of the data.
dThe Fourier transform of the time series and the density of stochastic observations that fell within the 95% CIs of the data.
eThe number of epidemic peaks of the ﬁrst strain in the data and the density of stochastic observations that fell within the 95% CIs of the data.
fThe number of epidemic peaks of the second strain in the data and the density of stochastic observations that fell within the 95% CIs of the data.
gProportion of realizations where all statistics match together in that realization.
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fitness between the two strains it is possible that one strain may
outcompete the other. The environmental transmission par-
ameters were selected based on estimates from experimental
data and values previously used inmodelling studies, however,
there remains large uncertainty in these values [3,21,23]. The
impact of variation in four key parameters on the probability
of persistencewas done for a single strain, itwould also be inter-
esting to assess how the probability of co-infection persistence
varied according to the relative combinations of these
parameters across the two strains.
Many of the fundamental epidemiological features of
LBMs remain poorly understood. These factors include: the
physical layouts of the markets, the holding capacity of differ-
ent markets, how far birds travel to come to market, how long
different types of birds stay in the market, and the rate and fre-
quency with which birds are sold onwards from the market
[33,34]. Furthermore, the actual size of the market from
which the data analysed here was collected remains unknown,
but is likely to impact the dynamics of infection, as
demonstrated by our analysis.
The trade of live birds in and between different LBMs is of
cultural importance in mainland China [2], in addition to other
regions in South East Asia and some parts of Africa. Periodic
closure of LBMs can halt the transmission of AI, particularly
with respect to preventing new human cases [35], however,
in the absence of routine cleaning, market rest days and ensur-
ing that birds come into the market infection free, wLBMs will
continue to amplify AI. The simultaneous persistence of mul-
tiple strains within the market increases the probability that a
bird will become co-infected. When co-infection risk is high,
the risk of reassortment is increased, highlighting the impor-
tant role that LBMs may play in the emergence of novel
influenza A lineages. Our results demonstrate the importance
of controlling the size of the market population to prevent
self-sustaining transmission, but that uncertainty remains in
terms of characterizing the ecology of LBMs in China.
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